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INTRODUCTION
Computer systems are increasingly being viewed in terms of multiple,
interacting autonomous agents. This is because the multi-agent paradigm
offers a powerful set of metaphors, concepts, and techniques for con-
ceptualizing, designing, implementing, and verifying complex distributed
systems (Jennings, 2001). In this context, an agent is viewed as an encapsu-
lated computer system that is situated in an environment and is capable
of flexible, autonomous action in order to meet its design objectives
(Wooldridge, 2002). Building upon this, applications of agent technology
have ranged from electronic trading and distributed business process
management, to air-traffic and industrial control, to health care and patient
monitoring, to gaming and interactive entertainment (Jennings and
Wooldridge, 1998; Parunak, 1999; Luck et al., 2003).
Inmoredetail,inamulti-agentsystem(MAS),agentsneedtointeract.For
example, when agents are cooperative (e.g., coordinating robots in a disaster
rescue application), they need to communicate in order to obtain a shared
view of the environment and to coordinate their activities effectively (Tambe
et al., 2005). In applications where agents are self-interested (e.g., in a trading
environment), they also need to interact in order to negotiate and agree on
resource exchanges. In many such applications, communication is essential
due to the lack of central coordination or resource allocation mechanisms.
We offer the following definition of negotiation, adapted from work on
the philosophy of argumentation (Walton and Krabbe, 1995):
Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents, with
conflicting interests and a desire to cooperate, try to reach a mutually
acceptable agreement on the division of scarce resources.
The use of the word ‘‘resources’’ in the definition above is to be taken in
the broadest possible sense. Thus, resources can be commodities, services,
time, money, etc. In short, anything that is needed to achieve something.
Resources are ‘‘scarce’’ since competing claims over them cannot be fully
simultaneously satisfied. In a multi-agent system context, the challenge of
automated negotiation is to design mechanisms for allocating resources
among software processes representing self-interested parties, be these par-
ties human individuals, organizations, or other software processes.
To date, various interaction and decision mechanisms for automated
negotiation have been proposed and studied. These include: game-
theoretic analysis (Kraus, 2001; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Sandholm,
2002); heuristic-based approaches (Faratin, 2000; Fatima et al., 2002;
Kowalczyk and Bui, 2001); and argumentation-based approaches (Kraus
et al., 1998; Parsons et al., 1998; Sierra et al., 1998).
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A central feature of all these negotiation mechanisms is that agents
have some choice of what they may utter, and possibly when they may make
utterances. Open-cry auction participants, for example, choose both the
content of their utterances (within the constraints of the particular auction
protocol) and the timing of their utterances; participants in a sealed-bid,
single-round auction may only choose the content. In argumentation-based
approaches, participants have still greater freedom in their choice of the
content (covering issues such as threats, promises, appeals, etc.) and timing
of utterances.
Given this range of options, agent designers therefore face an impor-
tant question: What should an agent say, and when, in a particular negoti-
ation interaction?
To answer this question, we turn to the realm of negotiation strategies,
which are here defined as rules or algorithms that provide an answer to this
question.
Now for certain types of negotiation frameworks, game theory can be
used to characterize optimal strategies and predict the outcomes of a game
(Binmore and Vulkan, 1997). However, it has been argued that game-
theoretic approaches are insufficient for designing strategies in complex
domains (Jennings et al., 2001). This leaves a gap to be filled, as there
are no structured approaches to designing strategies for such complex
domains. In fact, most strategies in such frameworks have thus far been
designed by resorting more or less to intuition and experience. To rectify
this, we present a methodology that guides agent designers in the design
and selection of strategies for agents engaged in negotiation interactions.
The methodology provides a disciplined approach to analyzing the negoti-
ation environment and designing strategies in light of agent capabilities.
This article advances the state-of-the-art in automated negotiation in
two main ways. Firstly, the article presents the first structured methodology
for guiding agent designers in designing and selecting strategies in
complex, open negotiation domains. Here we exemplify such domains by
considering the Trading Agent Competition and argumentation-based
negotiation. Secondly, the methodology presents a step toward understand-
ing the common underlying principles of negotiation strategies in various
complex domains. This has the potential to enable agent designers to reuse
strategies or strategy components across multiple domains and select
between strategies based on the characteristics of a given domain. Hence,
our methodology can act as a bridge between the theoretical and simula-
tion-based studies of automated negotiation on one hand and the software
engineering of practical applications of automated negotiation on the
other.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we
motivate the need for a strategy design methodology. Then, we present
STRATUM 491D
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the STRATUM methodology for strategy design. Then, we demonstrate
how the methodology can be applied by considering two case studies:
one from the Trading Agent Competition (Eriksson and Janson, 2002);
the other from argumentation-based negotiation (Rahwan et al., 2003).
WHY A METHODOLOGY IS NEEDED
In this section, we motivate the need for a strategy design methodology.
In the next subsection, we demonstrate that the analytical approach of
game theory is not suitable in certain domains. Then, we also demonstrate
why agent-oriented software engineering methodologies fall short of pro-
viding structure to the strategy design process. The last subsection scopes
the contribution of the article in light of these observations.
Relation to Automated Negotiation Approaches
Researchers in the area of MAS initially used the tools of classical
game theory to design strategies for negotiating agents (Rosenschein and
Zlotkin, 1994). In game-theoretic analysis, researchers typically attempt to
determine the optimal strategy by analyzing the interaction as a game
between participants and seeking its equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1956; Stengel,
2002). The strategy determined by these methods is typically shown to be
optimal for a participant, given the game rules, the assumed payoffs and
preferences of participants, and assuming that agents have common knowl-
edge that they are all rational
1 and that participants have no knowledge of
one another not provided by introspection. In such cases, it is possible to
use game-theoretic techniques in order to design resource allocation
mechanisms that force agents to follow prescribed optimal strategies (Dash
et al., 2003).
However, it quickly turned out that the assumptions of game theory are
often not satisfied in multi-agent systems (Jennings et al., 2001). The results
of classical game theory (e.g., about the optimal strategies) are only valid
under the assumptions of perfect rationality.
2 However, in real applications,
agents may be resource constrained, malicious, or whimsical or simply
badly coded, so that participant behavior may not conform to the assump-
tions of economic rationality. In such cases, researchers have turned to heu-
ristic methods. Heuristics are rules of thumb that produce ‘‘good enough’’
outcomes and are mainly based on empirical testing and evaluation. In
heuristic-based frameworks, strategies have been proposed that are based
on, for example, the underlying utility model, decay functions of factors
such as utility and time (Faratin, 2000; Kraus, 2001), or fuzzy modeling
of the environment (He et al., 2003). Very specific bargaining strategies
have been analyzed, for example, by investigating their optimality (Fatima
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et al., 2001), their performance in multiple negotiation rounds (Faratin,
2000), or the resulting social welfare (Harsanyi, 1956).
However, there is no ‘‘methodology’’ for guiding designers of strategies
in heuristic-based frameworks. So, given a new type of negotiation domain,
such as the travel services market of the Trading Agent Competition (TAC,
2003), there is little guidance on how one might go about designing negoti-
Another type of framework that challenges game-theoretic approaches
is what is becoming known as the argument-based negotiation approach
(Rahwan et al., In these frameworks, agents can exchange, in
addition to proposals and indications of their acceptance or rejection,
other meta-information about proposals, such as the reasons for proposals
and the reasons for accepting or rejecting them. Here, strategies were also
proposed on an ad hoc basis (Sierra et al., 1998; Sadri et al., 2001) possibly
inspired by the psychology of human persuasion (Kraus et al., 1998;
Ramchurn et al., 2003). Thus, there has been little work that investigates
generic principles underlying these heuristics.
While the game-theoretic approach is well understood, we are moti-
vated by the lack of methodology for guiding designers of strategies in
heuristic-based or argumentation-based negotiation encounters. It would
be of value, therefore, to provide a methodology that gives generic guide-
lines for strategy designers operating under such frameworks. To this
end, this article takes the first step toward characterizing a methodology
for designing strategies under complex protocols and relaxed assumptions.
Thus, given a specific heuristic or argumentation-based encounter
described in terms of interaction rules and a set of agents participating
in negotiation, the methodology would assist agent designers in distilling
essential features of the framework and using these to incrementally design
sophisticated strategies.
Relation to AOSE Methodologies
In recent years, there has been an increase in research on agent-
oriented software engineering (AOSE) methodologies. A number of AOSE
methodologies have been proposed for guiding the design and construc-
tion of multi-agent systems, such as GAIA (Zambonelli et al., 2003;
Wooldridge et al., 2000), Tropos (Bresciani et al., 2004), ROADMAP (Juan
et al., 2002), Prometheus (Padgham and Winikoff, 2004), OperA (Dignum,
2004), and AUML (Bauer et al., 2001). One might reasonably ask whether
AOSE methodologies could provide the answer to the problem of strategy
design for protocols that cannot be studied using game-theoretic tools.
Now there have been some attempts to use or produce AOSE meth-
odologies to engineer negotiation protocols and agents. For example, Ashri
STRATUM 493
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et al. (2003) use theSMARTagent construction model (d’Invernoand Luck,
2001) to specify negotiating agent architectures. Fritschi and Dorer (2002)
use an AOSE methodology to construct an agent that participated in the
Trading Agent Competition. Kungasand Rao (2004) present a methodology
for agent-based Web service discovery and automated composition using
negotiation. Dumas et al. (2002) propose a formal language for specifying
negotiating agent behavior, which combines state charts and
Naamad, 1996) and defeasible logic programs (Billington, 1993).
However, AOSE methodologies are typically concerned with the process
of capturing domain requirements before the agent system exists and then
transforming these requirements into multi-agent system specifications.
During this process, system designers can follow the methodology as they
describe the environment, agent capabilities, roles, relationship structures,
interaction protocols, and so on. When it comes to specifying agents, cur-
rent AOSE methodologies usually assume that agents are specified by the
same designer or, if specified by multiple designers, that they are coopera-
tive. In an open system, where agents can be programmed by anyone, and
cannot be assumed cooperative, current AOSE methodologies provide no
advice on the design of negotiation strategies.
The methodology we present here should not be seen as a competitor to
existing AOSE methodologies when they are applied to specifying open
negotiation environments. Instead, our methodology complements AOSE
methodologies since we assume a multi-agent system specification is par-
tially given (implicitly or explicitly) using some language, and we provide
guidance to an agent designer in programming strategies that operate
within the given specification.
Scope
In this subsection, we define more precisely the scope of this article.
This requires a characterization of the various components of a negotiation
framework. A negotiation framework can be seen to involve the following
(Bartolini et al., 2002):
1. a negotiation locale, which is a communication platform through which
agents interact;
2. a host (or monitor) that manages the negotiation locale and facilitates the
negotiation, making sure participants abide by the protocol rules, pay
violation fines, etc.;
3. a negotiation template, which is essentially a language for describing deals;
4. a set of negotiation rules, which include:
(a) rules for participant admission;
(b) rules for checking proposal validity;
494 I. Rahwan et al.
(HarelD
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
R
a
h
w
a
n
,
 
I
y
a
d
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
7
:
1
5
 
1
1
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
(c) rules for protocol enforcement, which include rules that specify
when agents can make proposals, accept proposals, make other utter-
ances, etc.;
(d) rules for updating status and informing participants, which specify
when agents can access what information and how the overall state
of the negotiation (e.g., current highest bid) is updated;
(e) rules for agreement formation, which specify when an agreement is
reached (e.g., an English auction ends with agreement if an accept-
able bid is not exceeded by another bid within a specified time
period);
(f) termination rules, which specify under what conditions the negoti-
ation terminates (successfully or unsuccessfully);
5. a number of participants, with their internal decision-making compo-
nents (e.g., their architectures, proposal evaluation logic, etc.) and their
negotiation strategies.
This article is specifically concerned with the design of the participants in a
negotiation framework, and in particular with their strategies. To this end,
Figure 1 depicts the scope of our methodology, which has the specific pur-
pose of helping designers of participating agents specify their agents’
negotiation strategies. We are hence not concerned with guiding software
engineers in designing the rules of negotiation or specifying languages
for describing agreements, etc. In fact, we assume a negotiation framework
or mechanisms is given and specified, formally or informally, in some form.
However, since the effectiveness of strategies is highly dependent on the
nature of the underlying negotiation framework (rules, templates, etc.),
FIGURE 1 Scope of the STRATUM methodology.
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the methodology also guides agent strategy designers in distilling frame-
work characteristics that are relevant and useful for strategy design.
A METHODOLOGY FOR STRATEGY DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the STRATUM (for STRATegy via
Unorthodox Methodology)
3 methodology for designing agent negotiation
strategies.
The main function of the STRATUM methodology is to guide the
designer of negotiation strategies from domain and requirements analysis
to producing modular high-level specifications of strategies. These specifi-
cations should be generic enough to provide flexibility in the underlying
implementation details and specific enough to provide thorough and use-
ful guidance for programming strategies.
Typically, methodologies for software construction comprise a number
of stages. Each stage may result in one or more models that describe various
aspects of the problem or the system using some informal or formal
abstraction or language. STRATUM consists of the stages described in
Figure 2. The stages arose from our earlier work on characterizing strategic
factors in negotiation (Rahwan et al., 2003a). These stages should not be
understood as a strictly sequential process. The arrows represent the overall
direction of logical dependency between the models, but the designer may
FIGURE 2 Stages of the methodology.
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do the development by iterative refinement across stages. In the next sub-
sections, we discuss each of these stages in more detail.
Stage I: Specify Objectives Model
The Objectives Model (OM) specifies the objectives of the agent. This
may be as simple as ‘‘maximize own expected utility’’ or involve a more
complex specification of the types of goals the agent needs to achieve in
the world (e.g., to increase the market share and minimize negotiation
time), the safety conditions it has to maintain (e.g., maintain minimum
budget deficit), the constraints imposed on these objectives (e.g., never
concede on quality), and so on. The OM may be expressed using natural
language statements but may also be specified formally; for example, using
some objective or utility function.
We assume that we are dealing only with purposeful agents. Hence,
each party to a negotiation may be assumed to have some objectives that
lead it to enter into the negotiation interaction. These objectives may be
at the highest level of an agent’s stack of goals or they may not be, in which
case they may support some other, even higher, goals. Entering into a parti-
cular negotiation interaction over certain resources with particular agents
at a particular time will, the agent believes, assist it in seeking to achieve
these goals.
An agent’s negotiation objectives may be a particular agreement to div-
ide the scarce resources under discussion. Such an outcome, however, is
not the only objective an agent may have. Indeed, an agent may enter into
an interaction with no intention of seeking a division of the resources in
question, but merely to confuse, distract, or otherwise delude the other
participants, or even non-participants. An agent may also engage in a
negotiation interaction to acquire information about a new domain, as
when potential house-buyers participate in auctions in order not to pur-
chase a house but to educate themselves about prevailing house prices,
or even about the auction process itself.
Agents may even enter into a negotiation interaction with one counter-
part in order to have a stronger negotiation position relative to another
counterpart in a separate interaction; business-to-business negotiations
often involve such parallel, competitive negotiations (Lilien et al., 1992).
These objectives are all valid—and, by any definition, rational—objectives
from a negotiation interaction. Their wisdom, feasibility, or ethical content,
though, are separate issues.
Note that the agent designer may not know precisely, at design time, in
what encounters and with what counterparts the agent will be engaged.
However, since agents are assumed to be ‘‘goal directed’’ or ‘‘purposeful,’’
it should be possible to spell out their overall objective. This overall
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objective may be realised in different ways depending on the type of encoun-
ter. Such detail is specified in stages III and IV, which are described below.
Stage II: Distill Capabilities Model
A key influencing factor on strategy design is the interaction capabilities
of the agent negotiator—what the agent is capable of doing in the interac-
tion. These capabilities constitute the agent’s capabilities model (CM).
These interaction capabilities are mainly characterized by the interaction
protocol the agents use. We assume that the protocol is already given by
the negotiation host designer (e.g., specification of auction rules or com-
munication language). Two main types of capabilities may exist:
1. Dialogical abilities: These specify what the agent is capable of uttering to
other agents. Such capabilities may be specified in terms of the com-
munication language used and the protocol rules that govern the use
of this language. Capabilities may also be constrained through some sys-
tem of value, such as a system for tracking agents’ commitments to check
their consistency (Maudet and Chaib-draa, 2003), or a system of repu-
tation or trust that removes agents that behave in a deceptive or mislead-
ing manner.
2. Relevant non-dialogical abilities: An agent may have non-dialogical capa-
bilities that may impact its dialogical abilities. Consider, for example, an
agent who wants to promise another agent to deliver a fuel tank at a cer-
tain time. If the mechanism given prohibits agents from lying or decom-
mitting on their promises, then the agent must actually have access to a
fuel tank and be capable of moving it to the specified address at the
specified time. In other words, the agent can only make the promise
(a dialogical ability) if it is capable of fulfilling the promise (a non-
dialogical ability).
Our interest here is in the dialogical abilities, and implicitly in the non-
dialogical abilities—but only insofar as the latter contribute to the former.
So, for example, an agent’s ability to inflict physical damage on another
agent is only relevant to negotiation if this ability can be used to create dia-
logical threats against that agent, such as ‘‘if you do not accept my proposal,
I will hurt you.’’ Finally, we stress that here we are not interested in the spe-
cifics of the agent’s internal capabilities (i.e., its ability to evaluate an offer
or generate preferences) but only in the dialogical manifestations of such
abilities (i.e., the ability to communicate desires to other preferences).
At the bottom level, an agent engaged in a negotiation interaction must
be able to make utterances that are legal according to the rules of the
498 I. Rahwan et al.D
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protocol. Above this level are some higher order capabilities, which may,
depending on the specific protocol, require utterance of a sequence of
locutions to be effected. Typical types of dialogical capabilities needed in
a negotiation encounter are listed in Table 1. This set of capabilities was
compiled based on observations of the automated negotiation literature
(Jennings et al., 2001) as well as literature on human negotiation (Young,
2001; Lewicki et al., 2003). A specific protocol may enable only a subset of
these capabilities. Moreover, a specific protocol may enable only certain
subtypes of these capabilities. For example, a protocol may enable an agent
to provide information proactively (capability C4) about its preferences but
not its beliefs. In any case, the agent designer must have a clear picture of
the agent’s dialogical capabilities.
Of course, an agent may be said to also have capabilities that are
complex combinations of these. For example, the ability to prevaricate
(Dunne, 2003) may be constructed from abilities to: request irrelevant
information; provide irrelevant, misleading, or confusing information; or
repeat previous questions or statements. Such capabilities may constitute
negotiation tactics or strategies and will be discussed in Stage IV.
TABLE 1 Common Types of Dialogical Capabilities in a Negotiation Encounter
Capability Explanation
C1 Make proposals Proposing potential deals to the counterpart
C2 Accept proposals —
C3 Reject proposals —
C4 Present information
proactively
An agent may present information in order to influence a
counterparty’s beliefs, preferences, intentions, etc.
C5 Seek information from
a counterpart
Participants may have varying abilities to extract information
from one another; for example, due to differing levels
of authority in a social structure
C6 Provide information
reactively
Agents may have differing capabilities to provide
information to one another; some agents may not be
able to lie or to answer evasively, for example
C7 Seek to exert pressure
on counterpart
An agent might be able to threaten or reward other
participants for accepting certain deals (Kraus et al.,
1998; Sierra et al., 1998); e.g., using authority
C8 Retract Commitments Agents may have ability to retract commitments or proposals they
have made previously. Retraction has been studied, for example,
in argumentation theory (Walton and Krabbe, 1995) and
in bargaining (Sandholm and Lesser, 2002)
C9 Withdraw Truly autonomous agents should have the ability to
withdraw from any interaction at any stage. Agents may
also have the ability to threaten to withdraw
C10 Re-enter Some auction protocols allow agents to withdraw
from auctions and re-enter them later
C11 Do nothing Be passive and wait until conditions chance; e.g., until
market prices go down or until counterpart concedes
because of his time constraints
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The CM is specified by the agent designer as a list of capabilities, which
is a subset of the list given in Table 1. In addition, the designer could pro-
vide a detailed description of how each capability can be performed. This
may include, for example, the protocol utterances that facilitate each capa-
bility or its enabling non-dialogical capabilities.
When identifying the agent’s capabilities, the designer also needs to
take account of constraints on the exercise of any potential capabilities.
Such constraints could include:
1. Interaction Protocol: The rules of the negotiation interaction protocol may
preclude or require certain utterances or certain types of utterances by
agents at particular times in an interaction. The FIPA Agent Communi-
cations Language, FIPA ACL, for example, requires agent sincerity: only
statements that are believed by an agent may be uttered using the inform
locution (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents, 2001). In
principle, such a condition must severely limit the use of FIPA ACL
for negotiations.
2. Values: By values, we refer to the ‘‘criteria’’ that motivate and constrain
the agent’s behavior. Examples of such values include ‘‘maximizing
expected utility,’’ ‘‘maximizing social welfare,’’ or ‘‘avoiding deceptive
behavior.’’ The agent’s values may preclude or require certain behaviors
and so constrain the potential capabilities of the agent. Young (2001),
for example, argues that the strategies of human negotiators are signifi-
cantly influenced by the value of maintaining their social identity.
3. Resource Constraints: Time, memory, or processing limitations on an agent
may limit its capabilities in a negotiation interaction.
Stage III: Construct Environment Model
This stage involves providing some representation of the negotiation
environment, including the negotiation counterparts, for the sake of
reasoning about them. The result constitutes what we refer to as the
environment model (EM) model. Reasoning about this model, either by
the strategy designer at design time, or by the automated agent at run time,
would provide a basis for the design and selection of appropriate strategies.
The environment model describes one or more of the following:
. Model of counterpart: This model captures how the negotiation counter-
parts behave, the information they may have, or how they are likely to
behave. For example, an agent wishing to acquire a resource may attempt
to model the negotiation behavior of the providers of these resources.
Providers may be hard, using set prices, or they may be soft, conceding
on price after a few bargaining rounds.
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. Model of peer: This model captures how other negotiators behave in the
system. For example, an agent wishing to acquire a resource may attempt
to model other competing consumers of that resource. If there are many
consumers with aggressive demand, this may give providers extra market
power and hence decrease their willingness to concede with other
consumers.
. Model of external conditions: Instead of modeling specific behavior of
counterparts or peers, an agent may attempt to model the external con-
ditions that affect these behaviors. For example, the designer of an agent
bidding in an exchange over oil stocks may attempt to consider the
expected economic conditions that would affect oil supplies and conse-
quently demand and prices. It is notable that the model of external con-
ditions only captures the agent’s perception of these conditions and hence
does not necessarily reflect the actual conditions.
Modeling other agents is a growing area of research, and techniques
range from probabilistic modeling of individual agent beliefs (Milch and
Koller, 2000; Gal and Pfeffer, 2003) to qualitative modeling of group mental
attitudes (Boella and van der Torre, 2004). Modeling the economic con-
ditions has also begun to receive some attention in the automated negoti-
ation literature. For example, He et al. (2003) enable agents to model the
‘‘state of the marketplace,’’ based on observations of supply and demand,
and adjust their bidding strategies accordingly using a meta-strategy based
on preprogrammed fuzzy rules.
STRATUM does not prescribe a particular method for modeling the
environment, as different methods would be more suitable for different
types of negotiation frameworks. However, we do provide a list of typical
environment features that the strategy designer could look for. These
features, described in Table 2, can be used as a blueprint to guide the selec-
tion of the most appropriate environment modeling method.
TABLE 2 Typical Environment Characteristics
Counterparts & Peers
– Aggressiveness: How aggressively is the peer or counterpart buying, selling, or bidding?
– Informativeness: How much does the counterpart or peer know? What information do they have
access to?
– Trustworthiness: Can peer or counterpart be trusted to fulfill promises, provide truthful
information, etc.?
External Conditions
– Rate of change: Are there patterns that capture change in external conditions, such as resource
supply, demand, prices, etc.? What factors are these conditions affected by?
– Competitiveness: How competitive are other agents? (This can be seen as a generalization
of the aggressiveness attitude to multiple agents.)
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Stage IV: Construct Tactics and Strategies
With the objectives identified, capabilities clarified, and environment
understood, we can proceed to designing actual strategies. This process
constitutes the tactic and strategy design stage. Intuitively, tactics represent
detailed low-level patterns of behavior, whereas strategies represent more
sophisticated negotiation behavior that makes use of simpler tactics.
Goal Decomposition vs. Tactic Composition
As stated earlier, we assume an agent enters a particular negotiation
interaction over particular resources using a particular interaction protocol
with particular counterpart agents at a particular time, in order to achieve its
negotiation objectives. In order to achieve these objectives, the agent may
attempt to achieve some subobjectives, with the belief that such subobjectives
assist in realizing the overall negotiation objectives.
4 Subobjectives them-
selves may be further decomposed into lower level sub-sub-objectives, and
so on. We can therefore see the process of strategy design in a compositional
fashion.
5
For example, a potential buyer entering into a negotiation with a car
dealer aiming to buy a car may seek to achieve this negotiation objective
by realizing each of the following subobjectives (in sequence):
X. learning about the alternative models available from the dealer
Y. establishing a preference ordering over some or all of these models
Z. getting a cheap price for the most preferred model.
The buyer might achieve the first subobjective by posing a series of ques-
tions to the car dealer. The second subobjective may be achieved by intro-
spection, perhaps involving a process of comparison of the expected
utilities of different models (Roberts and Lattin, 1991). To achieve the
third subobjective, the buyer may seek to achieve two lower level objectives:
Z.1 Informing the dealer about an offer made by a competing dealer; and
Z.2 Bargaining with the dealer through an exchange of offers.
Each of these sub-sub-objectives may be achieved directly by making a series
of utterances or through decomposition into further subobjectives, and so
on. This process guides the design of tactics and strategies.
Given this, Figure 3 depicts the interleaving processes of decomposing
negotiation objectives and composing capabilities. Objectives are decomposed
in a top-down fashion, while capabilities are composed in a bottom-up fash-
ion in order to construct tactics and strategies that achieve these objectives.
For example, to achieve the main negotiation objective, the designer may
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specify that the agent needs to achieve subobjectives SO-1 through to SO-n.
Each of these subobjectives may need to be further decomposed into sub-
sub-objectives, and so on. The same thing takes place, bottom-up, while
composing tactics from capabilities. In the figure, the arrow between the
two trapezoids denotes that capability description is informed by the
decomposition of objectives and vice versa—objectives decomposition is
informed by the capabilities available.
In the process of objective decomposition and strategy composition,
various types of interdependencies may be revealed. First, some objectives
may be found to be unachievable because the agent simply does not have
the required capabilities. For example, if an agent is not allowed to with-
draw from the negotiation, then it cannot threaten to do so. In such cases,
alternative subobjectives should be identified in order to achieve the main
negotiation objective.
Similarly, the parallel inspection of objectives and capabilities may
reveal new possible objectives and=or tactics=strategies. More specifically,
after attempting to map a given subobjective to a combination of capabili-
ties, the designer may discover that the capabilities can be combined in a
way not previously thought of. This combination could achieve a new, alter-
native subobjective that proves to be useful.
Objective decomposition and strategy composition may also reveal con-
flicts among two or more objectives; for example, because they require the
use of mutually exclusive capabilities. In such cases, the designer should
consider trade-offs between different conflicting objectives or seek alterna-
tive ways in which conflict could be avoided. The same could be said about
discovering conflicts among two or more capabilities, tactics, or strategies,
which means they should not be used in combination.
At the end of this stage, there must be a correspondence between the
objectives hierarchy and the tactics=strategies hierarchy. In other words,
each objective or subobjective, etc., must be achievable through a particular
tactic or combination of tactics, and each tactic must have an objective or
FIGURE 3 Decomposing objective top-down; composing capabilities bottom-up.
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subobjective, etc., as its purpose. This correspondence need not be a one-
to-one mapping, however, since a single tactic may contribute to more than
one objective, and a single objective may require more than one tactic.
However, the lack of one-to-one mapping reveals discrepancy in abstraction
between the two hierarchies and should be avoided if possible.
Composing Tactics and Strategies
We now list a number of possible low-level tactics (or equivalently, low-
level subobjectives) that may contribute to an agent’s achievement of its
negotiation objectives. To date, no comprehensive list of all possible appli-
cable negotiation tactics is available in the multi-agent literature or in the
literature on human negotiation. Therefore, we list those tactics inspired
by the multi-agent negotiation literature as well as informal advice to
human negotiation participants (Fisher et al., 1991; Young, 2001; Lewicki
et al., 2003).
1. Seek to change a counterpart’s beliefs. One participant in a negotiation
may judge it to be in its interests to have other participants believe
certain propositions about the beliefs, intentions, preferences, or
constraints of the first participant or about the domain in question.
These propositions may be true or false. Providing information to the
counterparts may enable an agent to explain the reasons for its beliefs,
preferences, etc. It has been argued (Fisher et al., 1991; Rahwan et al.,
2003c) that agreement is more likely in negotiation interactions when
participants understand each others’ interests (desires, preferences,
goals, etc.) rather than their current positions.
2. Gain a better understanding of a counterpart. An agent may have uncer-
tain or incomplete information about its counterpart. Moreover, coun-
terparts may be seeking to mislead a participant about their beliefs,
intentions, preferences, constraints, etc., or about the domain. An agent
may then seek to gain a better understanding of its counterpart’s true
mental states or constraints.
3. Seek to discuss a particular issue. By moving the interaction toward parti-
cular issues, a participant may be able to frame the problem in certain
ways and thus influence the mental states of its counterparts. A seller
of a particular make of car, for example, may seek to turn the topic of
discussions with potential buyers toward attributes on which this make
of car scores highly.
4. Seek to avoid discussion. For the same reasons, a participant may wish to
steer discussion away from particular issues.
5. Seek fast termination. An agent with time or processing resource
constraints might seek a fast resolution or termination of the
negotiation.
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6. Seek to delay. An agent who believes it has greater time or other
resources than other participants may seek to delay resolution of the
interaction beyond the perceived resource limits of its counterpart
(Dunne, 2003).
7. Resist a counterpart. An agent may resist attempts by a counterpart to
achieve one of the above tactics.
With these main tactic types in mind, the strategy designer can start specify-
ing tactics to be used by the software agent. Specification of these tactics
must take into account the actual capabilities of the agent (as discussed
above). Tactic descriptions can also be compositional, so a tactic can make
use of other tactics already specified. In this respect, STRATUM provides
the designer with a tactic or strategy template, which is used to specify various
tactics. A particular instantiation of this template is called a tactic description
or strategy description. The tactic template, instantiated with the tactic
described in previously, is described in Table 3.
Each tactic description specifies the dialogical objective it is aimed at
achieving. The method cell contains an informal description of the different
steps the tactic involves in order to achieve its dialogical objective. The capa-
bilities and sub-tactics used to execute these steps are specified in the follow-
ing cell. Finally, the rationality condition specifies any constraints on the
rational use of the tactic. For example, one may specify that it is only
rational to make an offer to a counterpart if this offer is more preferred
to the counterpart than any previously made offer. Finally, the designer
can list the potential risks of enacting the strategy. This would enable the
programmer of the strategy to take these risks into account and provide
suitable solutions or precautions.
The process of designing strategies using tactics is similar to designing
tactics using primitive capabilities. We follow the intuitive distinction
between strategies, which govern an entire interaction or large parts of it,
and tactics, which govern just a small number of utterances in an
TABLE 3 Template for Tactic and Strategy Description
Tactic Name Tactic 1
Dialogical objective Get a cheap price for a preferred car model
Method – Inform the dealer about an offer made by a competing dealer
– Bargain with the dealer by exchanging offers
Capabilities & sub-tactics used – Capability C4 to provide information proactively
– Capability C7 to exert pressure on the car dealer
– Capability C1, C2, and C3 to make, accept and reject proposals,
respectively
Rationality condition None
Risk None
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interaction.Hence,onetacticmaysupportmultipleorcompetingstrategies.
For example, asking a direct question may implement a strategy to gather
information from another participant or it may implement a strategy to
delay resolution of the negotiation, or both. The methodology leaves to
the designer the decision about whether to refer to something as a ‘‘tactic’’
or a ‘‘strategy.’’
6 One might argue that this renders the distinction between
tactics and strategies redundant. Nevertheless, this conceptual distinction
may be useful from the strategy designer’s point of view. Indeed, this dis-
tinction has proved useful; for example, in the work on natural language
generation (McKeown, 1985).
Stage V: Test and Refine
The final stage of the methodology is to test the strategy in terms of
some appropriate criteria or metrics. This testing may also lead to an iter-
ative process of refinement, based on the new findings.
One way to perform testing is through empirical analysis. This would
involve running simulations of different dialogues using a variety of strate-
gies. Simulation parameters could be varied in a number of ways: among dif-
ferent strategies operating against a fixed type of counterpart, among
differenttypesoflow-leveltacticswithinaparticulargenericstrategy,interms
of the typesof counterpartsfaced, theinformation availabletoagents,or the
agent’s time constraints. Such simulations have started to be used to analyze
bargaining-based (Faratin, 2000), auction-based (He et al., 2003), and (to a
lesser extent) argument-based strategies (Ramchurn et al., 2003).
Another way to test strategies is through theoretical analysis. In game
theory, this is normally done using equilibrium analysis, though this
approach is usually aimed at designing the mechanism, not the strategy.
For strategies that cannot be studied using traditional game-theoretic tech-
niques, it is often hard to analyze strategies theoretically. Hybrid theoretical=
empirical approaches have been used, where the outcomes under different
strategies are first generated empirically and then studied analytically using
game-theoretic concepts. This approach has been used, for example, by
Fatima et al. (2004) to study bargaining in incomplete information settings.
In economics, behavioral game theory (Camerer, 2003) uses a hybrid
approach wherebysimulation experiments arefirst designedandrun. Then,
regularities in repeated interactions are explored and studied analytically
to identify evolutionary equilibrium conditions.
Summary of the Methodology
The STRATUM methodology is summarized in Figure 4. Stages I, II, and
III produce the OM, CM, and EM, respectively. Then Stage IV involves the
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simultaneous decomposition of objectives and composition of capabilities
in order to produce tactics that eventually form strategies. Finally, the test-
ing and refinement stage leads to either (i) adjusting the environment and
counterpart model or (ii) repeating Stage IV with different decompositions
of objectives and compositions of capabilities.
It is worth noting that the clarity of the given multi-agent system speci-
fication influences the ease in which the OM, CM, and EM can be captured
by the negotiating agent designer. In some situations, the designer is given
explicit specifications of the objectives, the agent’s capabilities, and the
environment in which agents operate, making the OM, CM, and EM easy
to capture. This is the case, for example, when the protocol is specified
clearly in terms of declarative rules or where the counterparts are fully pre-
dictable (e.g., in complete information settings). On the other hand, if the
multi-agent system is not thoroughly specified, the strategy designer needs
to make these implicit models explicit.
APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY
In this section, we demonstrate, through two case studies, how the
STRATUM methodology can be used to aid the design of tactics and stra-
tegies in particular negotiation frameworks. In the first case study, we
explore an existing strategy used in the Trading Agent Competition
(TAC, 2003) and demonstrate that STRATUM captures notions that the
FIGURE 4 Abstract view of the methodology.
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designers have included in the design of their strategy. In the second case
study, we present another case that addresses a different style of negotiation;
namelyinterest-basednegotiation(IBN)between two agents (Rahwan,2004).
We selected these two domains for our case studies because they exemp-
lify significantly different approaches to automated negotiation. The TAC
domain involves multiple concurrent negotiations using a variety of
auction-based protocols. Here, the focus is on modeling the general
dynamics of the environment and reacting accordingly. The IBN domain,
on the other hand, involves a richer communication language based on
computational models of argumentation. Here, the focus is on modeling
the negotiation counterpart and planning an argumentation strategy to
persuade the opponent of changing its beliefs and goals.
It is worth noting that we do not undertake a thorough and complete
application of the STRATUM methodology in the case studies below. Instead,
our aim is to give the reader a feel forhow the different stages of the method-
ology can be applied in particular, relatively rich, negotiation scenarios.
Case Study 1: Trading Agent Competition
We now deconstruct an existing strategy used by an agent participating in
the Trading Agent Competition (TAC, 2003). Through this ‘‘rational decon-
struction,’’ our aim is to demonstrate that STRATUM captures notions that
the designers of this strategy have reasoned about as they designed their
strategy. Our aim is that this deconstructive exercise will help support our
claims about the feasibility of the methodology and its consistency with cur-
rent actual practice. Specifically, the analysis is based on SouthamptonTAC
(He and Jennings, 2003), a trading agent developed at the University of
Southampton, and one of the most successful agents in TAC2002.
We start with a brief description of TAC games.
7 In a TAC game, there
are eight software agents that compete against each other in a variety of auc-
tions to assemble travel packages for 64 customers (8 customers each). A
package consists of (i) a round-trip flight during a 5-day period betweenTAC-
town and Tampa; and (ii) a stay at a particular hotel for every night between
their arrival and departure. Customer satisfaction is measured in terms of
utility, and each agent attempts to maximize its customers’ utility, as mea-
sured against customer preference data that is randomly generated at the
start of the game. Agents can also bid for the optional entertainment package,
which can provide additional utility. There are different types of entertain-
ment options. An individual game lasts 12 minutes and involves 28 auctions.
Each component in a package is traded in a different type of auction:
. Flights are sold in single seller auctions, for which the ask price is updated
randomly every 24 to 32 seconds.
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. Hotels are traded in 16th price multi-unit English auctions. There are
eight hotel auctions that close in random order at the end of every
minute after the 4th. When a hotel auction clears, it allocates 16 rooms
to agents that bid the 16 highest prices.
. Entertainment tickets are randomly provided to agents, 12 tickets each, at
the beginning of the game. Then agents can trade their tickets in a con-
tinuous double auction (CDA), where agents can buy and sell at any time
before the game closes. Tickets are only useful to a customer if they are
for different events, on different dates, and for nights when the customer
is in town.
Designing bidding strategies for TAC auctions has proved to be a
challenging problem. There are many interdependencies between differ-
ent kinds of auctions (e.g., flights will be useless if the hotel rooms are
not available) and within the same auction (e.g., having an extra ticket
for the same entertainment is useless). This means that agents have to solve
combinatorial optimization problems in a very short time (Eriksson and
Janson, 2002). Moreover, there is an inherent uncertainty in the domain
(e.g., since flight prices change randomly) and there is no way to predict
precisely how other agents will behave.
Given this background, let us deconstruct SouthamptonTAC-02 based
on STRATUM. Stage I (specifying objectives) is straightforward, since the
objectives are explicitly stated in the form of the utility formula that takes
into account complex customer preferences over flight, hotel, and enter-
tainment combinations (see TAC, 2003, for details). Each agent attempts
to maximize its overall utility based on the given customer’s preferences.
Stage II (specifying capabilities) is again relatively simple. This is
because the protocol allows relatively few dialogical capabilities. Agents
have the ability C1 of making proposals in the form of bids according to
the different auction protocol rules, the ability C2 to accept proposals in
the entertainment CDAs, and the ability C5 to seek information from coun-
terparts indirectly by observing their bidding behavior. Finally, agents have
the ability C11 (do nothing) by simply not making any bids. Agents are
not allowed to leave the game before it is over or enter the game after it
starts. Moreover, agents have no external non-dialogical abilities that may
influence their dialogical abilities.
The authors of SouthamptonTAC-02 invested a significant effort into
Stage III (constructing the Environment Model). In the authors’ own
words: ‘‘Our post hoc analysis of the TAC2001 competition shows that an
agent’s performance depends heavily on the risk attitude of its opponents’’
(He and Jennings, 2003, p. 221).
This marks an explicit recognition by the authors of the importance of
modeling the negotiation environment (or, more precisely, peer agents in
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the environment). To this end, the authors identify three types of environ-
ments, based on the prices of hotels: (i) competitive environments where the
prices of the hotels are very high, (ii)noncompetitive environments where
agents can get cheap hotel rooms, and (iii) semicompetitive environments,
which are in between. Environment type recognition is performed by moni-
toring the hotel prices during the game. Recognition is based on fuzzy pat-
tern recognition techniques, which classify the environment based on the
degrees of membership of the asking price in the fuzzy sets representing
the three environment types mentioned above.
Note that the authors did not use the prices of entertainment tickets or
flight tickets as a measure of competition. This is because they have
observed that flight prices and entertainment tickets prices are similar
whether the game is competitive or non-competitive. It is the hotel closing
prices that identify the nature of the opponents.
8
Let us now move to Stage IV (constructing tactics and strategies). Given
the limited number of dialogical abilities allowed, tactics in TAC are mainly
characterized by the following two families: seeking to delay and seeking fast
termination. In other words, tactics are mainly time dependent. The precise
way in which agents delay or speed up their buying and selling, and the rea-
sons for doing so (e.g., based on price prediction), are what constitute TAC
strategies.
The authors begin with the main objective in mind: to maximize the
utility. Then, they divide this objective into the following subobjectives:
(i) predicting the hotel closing prices; (ii) allocating flights, hotels, and
entertainment tickets obtained to the eight customers so that utility is max-
imized; (iii) deciding when to bid in the flights auctions; (iv) deciding what
entertainment tickets to buy and sell in the continuous double auctions;
and (v) deciding what hotel auction to bid in and at what price (He, 2004).
Note that objectives (i) and (ii) above are not dialogical objectives since
they involve internal calculations by the agent rather than interaction with
other agents. The first objective is achieved using fuzzy rules, while the
second is achieved using an integer and linear programming solver. Among
the three remaining objectives, our interest in the remainder of this section
is in the strategy used to achieve objective (iii) for deciding when to bid for
flight tickets.
Based on observations during the earlier TAC-01 competition, the
authors of SouthamptonTAC-02 recognized the need for adapting to the
different types of environments described above. The authors characterize
a risk-averse (RA) tactic as one where the agent buys a small number of flight
tickets at the beginning of the game and bids for hotels according to the
situation as the game progresses. A risk-seeking (RS) tactic, on the other
hand, is one where the agent buys a large number of flight tickets at the
beginning of the game and therefore does not change its customers’ travel
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plans often during the game. The authors state the following observation
about the risk-averse tactic, based on their experience in TAC2001:
a risk-averse agent...is highly flexible and copes well when there is a signifi-
cant degree of competition and the hotel prices are high....In this way, it
avoids buying extra hotels which cost extra money. Also, the agent can
receive optimal utility by not shortening the stay of its customers. (He
and Jennings, 2003, p. 221, 226)
The authors also make the following observation about the risk-seeking
strategy:
a risk-seeking agent...does well in environments in which hotels are cheap.
For example, when a hotel price goes up sharply, a risk-averse agent would
stop bidding on that hotel (changing the stay to a counterpart hotel or
reducing the trip period). In contrast, a riskseeking agent will insist on
bidding for that hotel, although the price is very high. In so doing, it
hopes that the price will eventually stabilise (hence the risk)...[It] is
highly effective in noncompetitive environments...because there is little
competition in hotel bidding and the agent can always obtain what it
wants. (He and Jennings, 2003, p. 222, 226)
It is possible to characterize the above observations, which guided
the design of the SouthamptonTAC-02 strategy, using STRATUM tactic tem-
plates. The risk-averse and risk-seeking tactics are encoded in Tables 4 and 5,
respectively.
Stage IV of strategy design does not stop here. The authors make the
following additional observation:
TABLE 4 Risk-Averse Tactic Specification
Tactic Name Risk-Averse Tactic (RA)
Dialogical objective – Avoid buying extra expensive hotel bookings
– Optimize utility by getting the lengths of customers’ visits right
Method – Buy small number of flight tickets at the beginning
– Bid on hotels if prices are not very high; otherwise, switch to the
other hotel type or change the journey
Capabilities &
sub-tactics used
– Ability C1 (making proposals=bids)
– Ability C5 (seek information) by observing other agents’ bidding behavior
– Ability C11 (do nothing)
Rationality condition Environment is competitive
Risk If the environment is noncompetitive, the agent misses out on
opportunities to optimize length of trips
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After our experiences in TAC-01, we came to believe that there is no single
best strategy that can deal with all the different types of TAC environment.
For example, a risk-seeking agent...is highly effective in noncompetitive
environments. This is because there is little competition in hotel bidding
and the agent can always obtain what it wants. On the other hand, delaying
buying flights and shortening the stay of customers
9 works well in competi-
tive games. For this reason, SouthamptonTAC dynamically varies its bid-
ding strategy according to its assessment of the environment type. (He
and Jennings, 2003, p. 226)
Based on this observation, SouthamptonTAC-02 uses a composed strategy
that makes use of the risk-seeking and risk-averse tactics as well as a
medium-risk tactic in semicompetitive environments.
10 This can be character-
ized in the STRATUM strategy template shown in Table 6.
Finally, for Stage V (testing and refinement), SouthamptonTAC-02
strategy testing has been mainly based on simulation. The authors set up
a number of controlled experiments in their lab. In particular, they
TABLE 5 Risk-Seeking Tactic Specification
Tactic Name Risk-Seeking Tactic (RS)
Dialogical objective Optimize holiday allocation and take advantage of lack of competition
in order to get the hotels it wants
Method – Buy large number of flight tickets at the start
– Purchase suitable hotels later, without changing flight bookings
Capabilities &
sub-tactics used
– Ability C1 (making proposals=bids)
– Ability C5 (seek information) by observing other agents’ bidding behavior
– Ability C11 (do nothing)
Rationality condition – Environment is noncompetitive
– If hotel prices rise, they eventually stabilize
Risk – If environment gets competitive, hotel prices rise significantly; as a result,
one must either pay high hotel prices or change travel plans and
shorten stay, hence wasting travel tickets already bought
TABLE 6 SouthamptonTAC-02 Adaptive Strategy
Tactic Name SouthamptonTAC-02 Adaptive Strategy
Dialogical objective Maximize utility by adapting to changes in the environment
Method – If environment is competitive, use the risk-averse tactic
– If environment is noncompetitive, use risk-seeking tactic
– If environment is semicompetitive, use medium-risk tactic
Capabilities &
sub-tactics used
– Risk-Averse Tactic
– Risk-Seeking Tactic
– Medium-Risk Tactic
Rationality condition —
Risk —
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simulated games in which different combinations of SouthamptonTAC-02,
risk-averse and risk-seeking agents played (among 8 participants). They
showed that SouthamptonTAC-02 does best in competitive games, where
the number of RS agents is big. The agent also does well in noncompetitive
environments, where there are many RA-agents. It turns out that the worst
situation for SouthamptonTAC-02 is when all players are like itself; i.e., they
are all adaptive. This is due to the fact that all agents switch their strategies
(i.e., adapt) at the same time, causing competition to be instantaneously
shifted or prices to fluctuate constantly.
Further empirical results were obtained in the actual TAC2002 compe-
tition. TAC2002 results showed that SouthamptonTAC-02 was ranked
second, with a difference of 0.8% from the top scoring agents. However,
since each game involves a wide variety of agents, it is difficult to draw
strong comparative results, such as whether the adaptive strategy made a
real difference.
Intermsofstrategyrefinementthattookplacebeforetheactualcompetition,
the authors denote that it was due to empirical testing through controlled
experiments that they discovered the need for modeling the environment
(He, 2004). This is what led them to using the fuzzy-logic-based method
formodelingtheenvironment’scompetitiveness.Theauthorsalsoindicated
that their future work includes improving the fuzzy modeling and pattern
matching techniques (He and Jennings, 2004).
One possible future refinement could be to attempt to deal with the
problem that arises when multiple identical adaptive agents populate the
game. In such cases, adding some randomness to the timing of agent’s
adaptation (e.g., by allowing an agent to switch its strategy before others
do) might enable an agent to overcome the problem mentioned above.
Another refinement suggestion is to include other factors when modeling
the environment. For example, instead of considering hotel prices as the
only measure of environment competitiveness, the strategy designers may
take account of competitors’ bidding behavior in entertainment and travel
auctions.
Case Study 2: Interest-Based Negotiation
Interest-based negotiation (IBN) (Rahwan, 2004) is a type of argumen-
tation-based negotiation frameworks (Rahwan et al., 2003b). We begin by
giving a brief overview of IBN before we discuss how STRATUM may be
applied to it.
The idea behind IBN is that in addition to exchanging proposals,
acceptance, and rejection messages, agents can also exchange information
about their underlying goal structures and use this information in order to
discover better deals. The IBN framework assumes agents are built using a
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deliberative architecture where they have beliefs about the environment and
capabilities that define what non-dialogical actions they can perform. Agents
have desire generation rules of the form C ) dð/Þ, which means that if con-
dition C is satisfied, then the agent will desire to achieve /. Using desire
generation rules, an agent can generate explanatory arguments (Amgoud
and Kaci, 2005) by which they conclude which desires to adopt. Planning
rules, on the other hand, are expressions of the form /1 ^   ^/n/
and mean that if /1;...;/n are achieved, then / is achieved. Using plan-
ning rules, an agent can generate plans (or instrumental arguments) for
achieving different desires. These plans have a hierarchical (tree) structure
in which the root node is a desire, all other nodes are goals that are instru-
mental toward achieving the desire, and leaf nodes represent the resources
required to execute the plan (i.e., required non-dialogical capabilities).
The relationship between beliefs, desires, goals, and resources is depicted
in Figure 5.
Agents calculate the utilities of different plans based on the plans’ costs
and the values of the desires they achieve, resulting in a preference order-
ing over different plans. As agents receive new information from the
environment or other agents, their existing arguments may be defeated,
resulting in change in their preference. An argumentation-based semantics
is given that specifies how preference changes occur.
11
The IBN protocol provides a way for agents to exchange information
about their goal structures and to exchange arguments that can alter these
goal structures. Locutions PROPOSE(.), ACCEPT(.) and REJECT(.)
allow agents to propose, accept and reject deals, respectively. The locution
ASSERT(.) allows an agent to make assertions about its own beliefs, goals,
sub-goals, or planning rules. Agents can ask one another for information
through the locutions QUESTION(.), which allows an agent to ask another
to state whether it agrees with a particular expression, and CHALLENGE(.),
which allows an agent to ask another for a justification of a particular
FIGURE 5 Relationships between attitudes.
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asserted belief or desire. The locution RETRACT(.) enables agents to
retract previously asserted statements and proposed deals.
Note that locution CHALLENGE(.) allows agents to either ask for argu-
ments (i.e., tentative proofs) that justify a particular ‘‘belief’’ or ask for
explanatory arguments that justify a particular ‘‘desire.’’ This cannot be used
to ask for arguments supporting goals that are part of instrumental argu-
ments. This is because a goal is adopted both because it is instrumental
toward a higher level goal or desire and because it is achievable through some
lower level goals or capabilities. For this purpose, there are two additional
locutions that enable agents to ask for arguments supporting goals. Loc-
ution REQ-PURPOSE(.) allows an agent to ask another for the higher level
purpose of a particular request (e.g., ‘‘Why do you need to travel?’’). A simi-
lar locution REQ-ACHIEVE(.) allows an agent to ask another for the sub-
plan that is meant to achieve the goal in question (e.g., ‘‘How do you intend
to book your ticket?’’).
The framework also has additional special predicates to use within the
locutions. The predicate prule(.) is used to exchange planning rules among
agents. Another predicate instr(X, Y) is used by one agent to indicate that
goals X are adopted because they are instrumental toward achieving higher
level goals Y. Predicates des(.), bel(.), and int(.) denote the desire, belief,
and intention modalities, respectively.
Finally, the framework uses so-called commitment stores (Walton and
Krabbe, 1995). Each agent i has its own commitment store CSðiÞ, which
stores commitments that follow from different utterances made by that
agent. For example, when an agent makes an assertion, this assertion is
inserted into its commitment store. This enables other agents to later
question or challenge these assertions. Also, when a proposal is made, a
conditional intention is inserted into the proposer’s commitment store.
The conditional intention states that if the counterpart agrees on its part
of the deal, then the proposer is committed to intending its own part.
Stage I of the STRATUM methodology requires identifying the agent’s
objectives in the negotiation. Objectives are specified explicitly in the IBN
framework, making the OM easy to document. Each agent attempts to
achieve a set of desires and tries to reach a deal that maximizes the utility
it receives (calculated as the difference between the worth of desires
achieved and the cost of the actions needed).
12
Stage II of the methodology requires defining the agent’s capabilities,
which constitute the CM. These are also explicitly specified already. In
terms of the typology in Table 1, the IBN protocol presented in Rahwan
(2004) enables, in some form or another, all capabilities except C7 (exert-
ing pressure on a counterpart). Agents can propose, accept, and reject
deals; they can also make assertions, retract commitments, ask each other
for information about each others’ beliefs, or ask questions about how they
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may achieve certain goals or what a particular goal is useful for. They can
also do nothing by uttering the PASS locution. Note, however, that the
exact type of capability is somewhat restricted. For example, while an agent
can request information about the counterpart’s higher level and lower
level goals (through the REQ-PURPOSE(.) and REQ-ACHIEVE(.) locu-
tions) and about the counterpart’s beliefs (using the QUESTION(.) and
CHALLENGE(.) locutions), the agent is not able to ask the counterpart
about the reason for believing a certain planning rule.
Moving to Stage III (constructing the environment model, EM), we first
know that both agents use the same underlying reasoning mechanisms. This
is an important assumption, since if the counterpart does not have an
explicit representation of underlying goals, for example, then it does not
makesensetoaskthatcounterpartaboutthepurposeofaparticularrequest.
In IBN, an explicit model of the counterpart is available at any time through
its commitment stores. One may also attempt to guess other information
about the counterpart by inferring its beliefs, goals, etc., from its utterances.
This would benefit from the assumption that all agents have symmetric
reasoning abilities. But for the purpose of this discussion, commitment
stores are sufficient. Figure 6 summarizes the mapping between the IBN
framework and the first three models of the STRATUM methodology.
Stage IV involves defining tactics and strategies from capabilities in light
of some decomposition of objectives. We now give an example of the kinds
of analysis involved in Stage IV. Suppose we attempt to design a strategy for
our seller agent A1 to negotiate with another buyer agent A2. As strategy
designers, we would like to design a particular strategy that contributes
to A1’s objective, and we want this strategy to be suitable for a situation
where A2 has already proposed some deal D to our agent, and that D is
not acceptable to A1. One way to achieve A1’s negotiation objective is to
FIGURE 6 Methodology models mapped in IBN.
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get A2 to accept another deal D0 which is preferred by A1. The most trivial
strategy to achieve this is to offer D0 to A2. This is clarified in the following
typical bargaining dialogue:
A2 : PROPOSEðA2;A1;DÞ
A1 : REJECTðA1;A2;DÞ
A2 : PASSðA2Þ
A1 : PROPOSEðA1;A2;D0Þ
If the above attempt fails, the only potential solution is to propose other
alternative deals D00, D000, etc. However, IBN enables alternative ways to reach
a solution by providing agents with a wider set of dialogical abilities. Reason-
ing about how these dialogical capabilities may influence the outcome
requires an understanding of the effect of these capabilities on preferences.
Knowing that in IBN both agents are assumed to have identical reasoning
models, we can make the following observations about the counterpart:
– A2 might have rejected D0 because it has some goal g and it believes
that D0 does not achieve g;
–I fA2 is persuaded that D0 does actually achieve g, then it might accept
D0 (subject to other issues, such as the costs involved);
Hence, based on the above understanding of the counterpart, we can con-
struct a strategy that attempts to persuade A2 that D0 does indeed achieve its
goal(s). But first, we need to explore how the IBN agent capabilities can be
composed to achieve such persuasion. Given that A1 has the ability C5 to
seek information about the purpose of a resource requested by A2, and
to present new information about planning rules, we can construct the fol-
lowing pattern to persuade A2 to accept D0:
– A1 finds out about a goal g that A2 wants to achieve using resource r,
which is part of deal D that A2 requested;
– A1 then argues that D0 can also achieve goal g;
– A1 offers D0 to A2;
This strategy can be described in STRATUM as shown in Table 7. The fol-
lowing dialogue sequence demonstrates how this strategy can be encoded
in the IBN protocol:
A2 : PROPOSEðA2;A1;DÞ
this leads to inserting intðrÞ for each r 2 ResourcesðDÞ to A2
0s
commitment store CSðA2Þ;where ResourcesðDÞ denotes the resource
required in deal D
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A1 : REJECTðA1;A2;DÞ
A2 : PASSðA2Þ
A1 : REQ-PURPOSEðA1;A2;rÞ
where r 2 D
A2 : ASSERTðA2;A1;instrðr;gÞÞ
this leads to intðgÞ being inserted to CSðA2Þ
A1 : ASSERTðA1;A2;pruleðr1 ^   ^rn gÞÞ
A2 : PASSðA2Þ
A1 : PROPOSEðA1;A2;D0Þ
where r1;...;rn 2 D0
If the strategy works, the above dialogue will be followed by an acceptance
from agent A2 using the utterance ACCEPTðA2;A1;D0Þ. The following is a
natural language description of a dialogue that uses the above strategy.
A1 : Why do you need the car?
A2 : To travel to Sydney:
A1 : You can also go to Sydney by flying there:
A2 : But this would be even more expensive:
A1 : We0re in the low-season; so I can book you a flight for only $250:13
A2 : That0s great: Go ahead and book it please:
In the above example, agent A1 simply presents information about an alter-
native way of achieving the goal of going to Sydney. Whether A2 accepts this
alternative might depend on other issues, such as whether A2 has petrol
vouchers or whether A2 wishes to visit a friend who lives on the way to
TABLE 7 Description of an Example IBN Strategy
Strategy name S1
Dialogical objective Cause counterpart to intend a deal that is more preferable to me
Method – Find out what deal the counterpart currently wants, call it D
– Find out what goal D is intended to achieve
– Assert that D0 also achieves that goal
– Offer deal D0
Capabilities
& sub-tactics used
– Capability C5 (seek information)
– Capability C4 (present information proactively)
– Capability C1 (make a proposal)
Rationality condition – Deal D0 must be acceptable to me, and more preferred to me than deal D
Risk —
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Sydney. Therefore, a more aggressive strategy would be to try to make the
driving alternative itself less appealing. As a result, this might make the
flying option more preferable, hence increasing the likelihood of its accept-
ance. This new new approach can be described by the following pattern:
– A1 finds out about a goal g that A2 wants to achieve using resource r,
which is part of deal D that A2 requested;
– A1 then argues that D0 can also achieve goal g;
– A1 persuades A2 that its previous deal D does not achieve goal g;
– A1 offers D0 to A2;
Note that this strategy is similar to strategy S1, except that it requires A1 to
persuade A2 to abandon D. So before we specify the new strategy, we need
to specify a tactic for achieving such persuasion. One way to do so is to show
a ‘‘side effect’’ of D that was not known to A1 before. This tactic is described
in Table 8 and is self-explanatory. We can now describe the new strategy by
referring to tactic T1. This strategy is described in Table 9.
TABLE 8 Tactic Description of an IBN Tactic
Tactic name T1
Dialogical objective Cause counterpart to abandon some intended deal D
Method – Ask the counterpart whether it intends some goal g0
– Argue that D has the undesirable side-effect of precluding g0
Capabilities & sub-tactics used – Ability to provide information about consequences
Rationality condition —
Risk —
TABLE 9 Description of an Example IBN Strategy
Strategy name S2
Dialogical objective Cause the counterpart to intend a deal that is more preferable to me
Method – Find out what deal the counterpart currently wants, call it D
– Find out what goal D is intended to achieve, call this goal g
– Assert that D0 also achieves that goal
– Cause counterpart to no-longer intend D
– Offer deal D0
Capabilities & sub-tactics used – Capability C5 (seek information)
– Capability C4 (present information proactively)
– Tactic T1 to cause counterpart to abandon D
– Capability C1 (make a proposal)
Rationality condition – Deal D0 must be acceptable to me, and more preferred to me than
deal D
Risk – After abandoning deal D, the counterpart may still not accept deal
D0 for some other reason. As a result, if our agent prefers accepting D
to nothing, and it is not possible to persuade the counterpart to
intend D again, then our agent is worse off
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The following is an illustration of how strategy S2 can be encoded in the
IBN protocol.
A2 : PROPOSEðA2;A1;DÞ
this leads to inserting intðrÞ for each r 2 ResourcesðDÞ to A2
0s
commitment store CSðA2Þ
A1 : REJECTðA1;A2;DÞ
A2 : PASSðA2Þ
A1 : REQ-PURPOSEðA1;A2;rÞ
where r 2 D
A2 : ASSERTðA2;A1;instrðr;gÞÞ
this leads to intðgÞ being inserted to CSðA2Þ
A1 : QUESTIONðA1;A2;intðg0ÞÞ
A2 : ASSERTðA2;A1;intðg0ÞÞ
A1 : ASSERTðA1;A2;pruleðr1 ^   ^rn :g0ÞÞ
where r1 ^   ^rn   ResourcesðDÞ
A2 : PASSðA2Þ
A1 : PROPOSEðA1;A2;D0Þ
where r1;...;rnwResourcesðD0Þ
The following follow-up natural language dialogue illustrates the usage of
the strategy:
A2 : I still prefer to drive to Sydney:
A1 : Are you collecting frequent flyer points?
A2 : Yes!
A1 : Because you are dropping the car in another state; you will not be able
to get frequent flyer points by hiring this car:
A2 : Oh! I thought I would: In that case; I prefer to fly and get the points:
The risk associated with strategy S2, as shown in Table 9, is clarified in the
following variant of the above dialogue:
A2 : I still prefer to drive to Sydney:
A1 : Are you collecting frequent flyer points?
A2 : Yes!
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A1 : Because you are dropping the car in another state; you will not be able
to get frequent flyer points by hiring this car:
A2 : Oh! I thought I would: In that case; I don0t want to hire a car; and
I 0d rather stay in Melbourne for my holiday; I hate flying:
Finally, testing and refinement of the strategies is performed in State V.
This stage on its own may require a separate study because of the richness
of the protocol and the complexity of possible dialogue sequences.
However, we shall briefly discuss some possible directions.
One option is to perform empirical testing through simulation. In argu-
ment-based negotiation, such types of studies have only been used for very
simplistic dialogues (Jung et al., 2001; Karunatillake and Jennings, 2004;
Ramchurn et al., 2003), where variations in parameters are relatively easy
to enumerate (e.g., by varying the strength of threats and promises based
on trust). The lack of extensive research in this area is largely due to the
complexity of the protocol and the fact that no generic formal theory of
argument-based interaction protocols exists. The STRATUM methodology
has the potential to enable designers of multi-agent systems to follow a
more systematic approach when enumerating variations of strategy within
richer protocols.
The other option for analyzing IBN strategies is to perform theoretical
analysis. This approach has been used to study simple strategies in per-
suasion dialogues (Amgoud and Maudet, 2002), as well as in inquiry and
information seeking dialogues (Parsons et al., 2002), but not in negotiation
dialogues as yet. Torroni (2002) studies whether certain strategies lead to
dialogue termination. The formal analysis is facilitated by the fact that
the system is specified using abductive logic programs (Sadri et al.,
2002). This enabled the analysis of dialogues in relation to the underlying
well-understood proof theory. This type of formal analysis may not be as
simple for the IBN framework, since many parts of the framework are
described in a more or less ‘‘semantic’’ fashion (e.g., the generation of
candidate intentions).
Discussion
The long-term objective of the research reported in this article is to
bridge the gap between the theory and practice of automated negotiation.
To this end, it is important to identify the domain-independent aspects of
negotiating agent design in order to come up with general principles that
can guide software engineers in building such agents.
The case studies above provide a hands-on feel for how the method-
ology can be applied. They also demonstrate how STRATUM can provide
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guidance to the process of strategy design in reasonably complex, and sig-
nificantly different negotiation environments. The first case study shows
that our methodology is consistent with current practice, since we were able
to rationalize an existing TAC strategy using STRATUM. The second case
study, on the other hand, shows that the same primitives and processes
can be applied to design strategies for a very different type of negotiation
environment, namely one that involves an expressive argumentation-based
protocol.
The applicability of STRATUM in such significantly different domains
demonstrates that the methodology’s primitives and processes are suffi-
ciently general to be applicable in a wide range of settings. In this context,
we note that this wide applicability of STRATUM was facilitated by our
deliberate choice to keep the methodology informal, rather than using a
specific formal language.
We also believe the methodology has the potential to provide a com-
mon framework for comparison of strategies across negotiation frame-
works, hence guiding designers in selecting appropriate strategies based
on distilled domain characteristics. For example, the adaptive strategy
described in case study 1 may be applicable in other domains where an
agent is able to observe other agents’ bidding behavior. Similarly, whenever
the protocol enables agents to seek information about other agents’ goals,
strategy S1 (see Table 7) may be applied in order to accelerate the process
of finding a mutually acceptable deal. Hence, the article contributes to a
vision discussed in an earlier paper:
...there are also a number of broader issues, which, to date, have received
comparatively little attention. These include...the development of a best
practice repository for negotiation techniques. That is, a coherent
resource that describes which negotiation techniques are best suited to
a given type of problem or domain (much like the way design patterns
function in object-oriented analysis and design). (Jennings et al., 2001,
p. 212)
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented the STRATUM methodology for guiding the design
of agent negotiation strategies. STRATUM is the first attempt to structure
the process of strategy construction in non-game-theoretic domains (i.e.,
in domains where the nature of the protocol and the limited information
available make it impossible to prescribe optimal strategies through mech-
anism design techniques (Dash et al., 2003). We demonstrated how the
methodology can be used through two case studies. Moreover, we believe
there is nothing in our model that is specific to one type of negotiation
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framework and so we believe it is generic. However, additional studies are
needed to better understand and confirm the scope of applicability of
the approach.
The hierarchical construction of strategies becomes particularly useful
for designers of strategies for rich negotiation dialogues, where agents have
a large number of possible utterances (and hence, dialogical abilities) that
they can use. This is because STRATUM enables designers to reason about
the objectives of a negotiation strategy as a planning problem. This view of
dialogue is consistent with the plan-based theory of speech acts proposed
by Cohen and Perrault (1979), which suggests that a ‘‘planning’’ view is
an adequate way to capture the way people reason about their utterances.
It is worth noting that it may be possible to exploit the hierarchical struc-
ture of objectives and strategies in order enableagents to composestrategies
at run time. In fact, this is exactly what SouthamptonTAC-02 does, since it
varies its underlying tactic based on observations of the environment. In
more complex dialogues, this would require the dependencies between
objectives and tactics on different levels to be represented formally in a
way that can be processed by a computer program. Then the reasoning
required may be made possible using a hierarchical task planner (Erol
et al., 1994). This would enable agents to modify their strategies, or even
their objectives, during negotiation. For example, an agent might abandon
an objective or atactic ifthe agentperceivesthat thisobjective or tacticis not
currently achievable or is counterproductive because the negotiation
counterpart is resistant to it. As with any other intentions, the defeasibility
of objectives in a computational agent requires some formal mechanism
for intention-reconsideration (Schut and Wooldridge, 2001).
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NOTES
1. Rational in the sense that they try to maximize their expected utilities, that their preferences satisfy
certain axiomatic conditions, and that their decisions assume that other agents are also rational.
2. Some work has been done on calculating equilibrium strategies while taking into account the cost
of computation (Larson and Sandholm, 2001). However, this approach has been applied to a parti-
cular, relatively simple bilateral bargaining setting, and it is not clear yet how this approach gener-
alizes to more complex negotiations (e.g., involving multiple concurrent negotiations).
3. The name illustrates that this methodology does not follow the traditional game-theoretic
approach. The word stratum is the singular of strata (a set of layers) and refers to the compositional
construction of strategies from simple tactics and capabilities.
4. This hierarchical objectives structure has a structural similarity to the landmarks theory of conver-
sation protocols of Kumar et al. (2002). However, our approach concerns only the objectives of an
individual agent and not the joint goals of all participants to an interaction.
5. When describing the negotiation objectives and strategies, we use the terms ‘‘objective’’ and
‘‘subobjective’’ deliberately in order to distinguish them from the agent’s own internal ‘‘goals’’
and ‘‘sub-goals.’’
6. In the latter case, the template above would be referred to as a strategy template.
7. For the interested reader, Greenwald (2003) provides a comprehensive description.
8. Based on personal communication with the designers of Southampton TAC-02 (He, 2004).
9. That is, a risk-averse behavior.
10. In this tactic, the agent buys most of the flights earlier and will only change travel plans if a signifi-
cant improvement can be obtained.
11. For brevity, we do not present the full specification of the argumentation system used. The inter-
ested reader may refer to Rahwan (2004).
12. Note that this uses a different, and simpler, formula to the one used in TAC.
13. Of course, this dialogue assumes that A1 prefers to sell a ticket for $250 than hire out a car for $400.
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